History of Americas:
Latin America 3
Peruvian Military regime

• A special case: the Peruvian military reformism

• In Peru, in the sixties, the oligarchy exploited mineral resources through agreements with foreign companies. The agrarian question was the most serious social problem: in the countryside there was a vast majority of Indians, controlled by Gamonales (landowners).
Peruvian Military regime

• After a long and turbulent period, in which there was some feeble attempt to agrarian reform, October 3, 1968 President Fernando Belaunde Terry was deposed by a military coup.

• A military Junta was established, headed by General Velasco Alvarado, composed by officers of army, navy and air force. The cause of the intervention was a government agreement with the International Petroleum Company (IPC), considered against to the national interest.
Peruvian Military regime

- The program of Junta was:
  - moralization of public life;
  - take out power from national oligarchy and foreign companies;
  - put an end to the marginalization of the masses.
- Junta expropriated IPC Properties were; claimed sovereignty up to 200 nautical miles; created a National Bank; strengthened diplomatic relations with the USSR and China and non-aligned countries.
Peruvian Military regime

• Reformist active role of the armed forces, who based their work on technocratic concepts learned during the academy.

• They called their program “revolutionary humanism”.

• Social characteristic: popular origin of army officers.
Peruvian Military regime

- It was created Sinamos (Sistema nacional de apoyo a la mobilitación social) in 1971. Sometimes written as two words, *sin amos*, “without masters” it was an integrating institution for peasant and working-class groups.
- The aim was to link the regime with the masses, identifying the government with its constituent groups and promoting a harmonious relationship.
Peruvian Military regime

- A second area that captured Junta’s attention was the squatter shanty towns, the *barriadas* around Lima and other cities. By the late 1960s it was estimated that about 750,000 recently arrived migrants lived in the environs of Lima.

- Military decided to reorganize the settlements, now renamed *pueblos jóvenes* (young towns), and enlisted the aid of the church in their efforts, granting of property titles to the migrant occupants.
The military regime started with a series of measures to reduce the role of foreign capital. At the time of the 1968 takeover, 242 firms were responsible for 44 percent of the country’s industrial production. This was unacceptable to the government.
Peruvian Military regime

- Peruvian Junta decided:
  - to require approval of new investment by a regulation board;
  - to prohibit the purchase of locally owned firms, and to exclude foreign participation from sensitive areas. Peru also assumed a conspicuous role in the promotion of regional economic cooperation through the Andean Pact.
Peruvian Military regime

- Most decisive steps involved expropriation. Soon after the coup, the regime announced the nationalization of IPC, with the delirious approval of the public, and the establishment of the state company *Petroperú*. The government took over other prominent foreign-owned firms: ITT (1969), Chase Manhattan Bank (1970), Cerro de Pasco (1974), and Marcona Mining (1975), the latter two replaced by *Minoperú*. 
Peruvian Military regime

- These actions met with hostility from the United States, but in February 1974 the two governments reached an accord through which Peru would pay $150 million as full settlement of all outstanding claims by North American businesses (including IPC) and Washington would withdraw its opposition to international loans for Peru.
Peruvian Military regime

- Agrarian reform

- Agrarian reform was considered the historical justification for the seizure of power by the military, also to resolve the indigenous problem, considered as a national issue.
Peruvian Military regime

• 1969: 4% agricultural units owned 80% cultivated land, 96% owned 20% of the land, with low levels of productivity.

• Ten years later: 40% of land had been expropriated for the benefit of 360,000 families. At least 50% of the agricultural population remained excluded by the reform.
Peruvian Military regime

• Problem of economic dependence from abroad: State controlled fisheries, mines, banks.

• But the price of copper, one of the main export products, depended on the international market. Price was high in 1968, low in 1973. With the lowering of income, the government resorted to the financing from abroad, thus resulting in an increased debt.
Peruvian Military regime

- Crisis, inflation, discontent with the agrarian reform, only partially carried out.
- Government decided a deflationary policy, but domestic criticism increased. General Bermúdez replaced Alvarado, however the economic situation worsened. Prices increased by 220% between 1974 and 1978.
Peruvian Military regime

• The *sol* (peruvian currency) decreased in value by 450 % over the same period. Even trade unions created by the military protested. Strikes and protests.

• A general strike paralyzed the country in 1977 and convinced the military to return to the Constitution.
Peruvian Military regime

- 1978: elections for a constituent assembly, new constitution, free elections in 1980. Belaunde won elections and came back to the government. The problems had not been solved, it was only increased poverty and had begun the process of massive urbanization.
Guerrilla

• *The guerrilla warfare in Latin America*

• To understand the context in which Latin American guerrillas developed and operated, we must consider the international and continental situation.
Guerrilla

• 1959 Cuban Revolution and the adherence of the new government led by Fidel Castro to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, resulting in the direct influence of the Soviet Union on a state of the American continent, had put USA in a state of alarm.
Guerrilla

• The cold war, from this point of view, behind the polarization communism-anticommunism, appeared as an additional mode of penetration and influence of the U.S. on Latin America in general and in some countries in particular.
Guerrilla

• In 1954, for example, in Guatemala, when the government of Arbenz Guzmán began, as part of an agrarian reform, the expropriation of lands belonging to the United Fruit Company, Guzmán was accused of communism by the United States. U.S. suspended financial aid, increasing those to the neighbors Honduras and Nicaragua, with the result of alerting the Guatemalan army.
Guerrilla

• A special force, with mercenaries and rebels, was assembled and trained by the CIA in Honduras. When Guzmán tried to obtain weapons from Czechoslovakia, this act became a proof of his ties with the Communist system. The rebels overthrew the legitimate government and returned the land to United Fruit Co.
Guerrilla

• Fearful of an advance of the revolutionary process in other countries of the continent, in 1960 U.S. President Kennedy proposed the Alliance for Progress, which included plans for agrarian reform, industrial development and policies of government assistance to Latin American countries.
Regarding Cuba, Kennedy decided to support the invasion of the island only after Castro had openly asked for USSR. In April of 1961, fifteen hundred exiles trained and armed by the CIA landed at the Bay of Pigs, hoping to be supported by the population, but were defeated, either due to lack of internal upheaval, and because, at the last moment, Kennedy retired plane support.

The episode marked the final approach of Castro to USSR. In 1962 Kennedy obtained to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States.
Guerrilla

• The Kennedy assassination put an end to the prospect of peaceful support for the reforms. With the Johnson presidency, the U.S. pursued the goal of Cuba’s political isolation; moreover, he gave support to the overthrow of the government in Ecuador in 1963, the 1964 military coup in Brazil, the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic.
Guerrilla

• The Organization of American States meeting in 1968 led, under U.S. pressure, to the announcement by all Latin American countries, except Mexico, of the rupture of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Guerrilla

• The policy of Nixon led to the overthrow of the democratic government of José Torres in Bolivia in 1971, and the support to coups d’état in June 1973, Uruguay, and in Chile in September of the same year, against the Unidad Popular government of Salvador Allende.
Two factors played a decisive role in the development of guerrilla warfare in Latin America: the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict, evident since the 1960s, and the success of guerrilla promoted by Fidel Castro in Cuba in the second half of the fifties, then resulted in the Cuban revolution.
Guerrilla

• With regard to the first factor, we must remember that the Soviets, leading an advanced economic country, considered possible to realize communism in other countries, exploiting the capacity expansion of their influence, the internal discrepancies in the western world and the social conflicts within individual countries.
Guerrilla

- The Chinese Communists, however, ruling a still predominantly agricultural country, considering really far the possibility to quickly reach the conditions of development of most industrialized countries, supported the realization of communism in currently conditions, and were propagating a civil war.
Guerrilla

- The difference between the two visions affected the Latin American Marxist left, causing disputes and divisions within the same communist parties. With regard to the second factor, the events of Cuba had shown to Latin American revolutionaries that it was possible to build an organization capable of involve popular forces interested in revolutionary change.
• Ernesto Guevara had also affirmed how it was not always required that a country had developed all the necessary conditions, according to the classical interpretations of Marxism, in order for a revolt to start, because the dynamism inherent in the armed struggle would have favoured it.
Guerrilla

• All this encouraged the “Chinese way” about the struggle against capitalism: it was necessary to look for new methods of involvement of the masses, both in cities and in the countryside.
Guerrilla

• The example of Cuba was for all Latin America: even non-Marxists were pleased to see an end to the long-term dictatorship under the U.S. influence in the biggest Caribbean island. This was even more true for the new revolutionaries, who could have, or not, relations with local Communist parties, which were often small, poorly organized, opposed and sometimes even illegal.
Guerrilla

• Moreover, Castro’s regime sought to export its revolution through the tactics of *foco* (in Spanish, “fire”): In the absence of a strong and combative Communist Party, it was possible to create small revolutionary groups, that would act by exploiting the local evolution of events. Thus, the Cuban example undermined all reformist strategies (victory election), encouraging armed struggle.
Guerrilla

• Goals of guerrilla strategy:
• - the formation of a group of revolutionaries in every country, militarily trained to the techniques of guerrilla warfare, espionage and sabotage.
• - the mobilization of student and youth movements, the incorporation of peasants in revolutionary action, the radicalization of conflicts regarding land tenure, social issues and ethnic minorities; recall of intellectuals to support the insurgency;
Guerrilla

- rejection of electoral activities as a method of approach to power; intensification of propaganda against USA capital and presence, and the aid of international organizations;
- the sabotage of the national production system, resulting in a flight of capital and foreign companies interested in investing in the country.
Guerrilla

• Several thousand young Latin Americans, between 1960 and 1966, received training in centers created in Cuba. The island became the basis for international conferences of revolutionary parties and movements. In the conference of Latin American Communist Parties of 1964 it was decided, in agreement with Moscow, to choose the tactic country by country: tactics could be the classical, through the action of the parties, or that subversive.
Guerrilla

• On January 3, 1966 in Cuba began the work of the First Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, called *Tricontinental*, for the joint participation of representatives of the three continents. Of eighty-two delegations, twenty-seven came from America.
Guerrilla

- The intensification of the armed struggle, the sabotage of the national and international economic centers, the involvement of the youth movements, student, women’s and trade unions were regarded as the main purpose to follow.
Guerrilla

- OSPAAAL (Organización de Solidaridad de los Pueblos de Asia, Africa y América Latina) was created, with headquarters in La Havana. In the final declaration was clearly affirmed the right of peoples to achieve their political, economic and social liberation in ways considered appropriate according to the individual situation, including armed struggle.
Guerrilla

• In 1967 the OSPAAAL began publishing the magazine *Tricontinental*. Then, the international organization of Latin American students, as well as the OLAS (Organización Latino - Americana de Solidaridad) was created, to support specific subversive action in Latin America.
Guerrilla

• Ernesto “Che” Guevara developed a real theory and practice of guerrilla warfare adapted to the needs of the Latin American continent and exportable in other areas, such as Africa.
Guerrilla

- The book *La Guerra de las guerrillas* written and published in 1960, formed the basis for all subsequent theories and practices of combat. Guevara, starting from the Cuban case, showed how, by a little group of men prepared to do anything, even remaining for long months in silence and inactivity, it was possible obtain the first successes and, with the support of small groups of peasants and students, the fall of the Cuban Batista regime, a dictatorial regime supported by foreign powers.
Guerrilla

- Great importance was attached to the planning stage of the action and the internal organization of the group and to the favorable circumstances to exploit. In Latin America, characterized almost by an agricultural economy, land action of the guerrilla had to be countryside. These principles were endorsed by Fidel Castro, who declared his intention to convert the Andean cordillera in the “Sierra Maestra of the Americas”.
Guerrilla

• The 1962 Castro’s Declaration of La Havana, made shortly after the expulsion of Cuba from the Organization of American States, emphasized the importance of the involvement of the peasant masses, which in many countries coincided with indigenous peoples.
Guerrilla

• The ideas of French intellectual Regis Debray, contained in the book *Revolución en la Revolución*, published in Cuba in 1967, constituted a further theoretical clarification.
Guerrilla

• Debray, starting from the Cuban guerrillas as well as it had developed up to 1966, analyzed the theory of *foquismo*, the development of the *foco*, as an instrument capable of carry out a revolution; also pointed out that the guerrilla war was to be developed in the countryside because it would have had greater possibility to expand.
Guerrilla

• Debray rejected the idea of the Popular Fronts and the conquest of power by election; he proposed the abandon of the city by the leaders of the various communist parties that, among other things, should not necessarily be considered as guerrilla leaders: the course of events would have lead to the choice of the head, as had happened in Cuba with Fidel Castro.
In fact, all these theories did not meet unanimous favor among Latin American Marxists. Proof of this was the lack of support for Guevara attempt to extend the focos in different countries of the continent. He saw revolutionary possibilities in Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela and Bolivia.
Guerrilla

• A few months after the launch of *Tricontinental* and OLAS, “Che” failed in the plan to provoke a peasant revolution in Bolivia, and was killed by the Bolivian army October 9, 1967. Since that time, Cuba reduced the support of subversive activities in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru.
Guerrilla

• Urban Guerrilla

• On the other hand, the outcomes achieved with actions taken by guerrilla groups in the cities of various countries, were totally unexpected, and made that many were convinced of the validity of to support the armed struggle in urban contexts.
Guerrilla

• Urban guerrilla was acting in a high population density context, and had some advantages: a greater availability of supplies such as food and weapons, and a higher degree of anonymity of individuals. Adverse factor were: the great closeness and greater responsiveness of repressive institutions.
The urban guerrilla had been successful in Uruguay, with the action of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional - Tupamaros. Just by the case of the Tupamaros inspired a Brazilian, Carlos Marighella, to write a little systematic work on urban warfare. After participating in the work of OLAS, Marighella had returned to Brazil to coordinate the various groups in the development of a revolutionary line. Marighella died in November 1969 in a gunfight with the police.
Guerrilla

- His writing became a real manual for revolutionary use, in which were outlined the characteristics of those who had to fight against the army and the police, with modern weapons and technology. The guerrillero had to use false documents and lead (if he was not already wanted by authorities) a normal life, with a regular job.
Guerrilla

• The writing of Marighella specified the criteria for the organization of the group, the methods of action planning, even the right mentality to carry out the guerrilla actions. Substantial elements for the success was the knowledge of the territory, the surprise factor of the action and the attack with small groups on different fronts.
Guerrilla

- Goals of urban guerrilla:
- cause the destruction of the industrial economy,
- weaken the system of police and the safety measures put in place by the government in the city, so that it could not cover all areas of the country.
Guerrilla

- The social climate, created in this way, would spread deep insecurity, political instability, great activities of trade unions, with strikes and street demonstrations, and would multiply acts of sabotage and “revolutionary justice” made by the guerrillas, with the elimination of military, politicians, representatives of international companies, spies, traitors, or with the kidnapping, to ransom political prisoners.
Counterrevolution

- Counterrevolution

- On the opposite side to the guerrillas, that is the State protection against subversion, alongside the implementation of special training programs for the police, was elaborated the so-called “National Security Doctrine”.
Counterrevolution

- The underlying logic was that against the guerrilla war was necessary to react with another war, a “dirty war”, against an internal enemy, which undermined the spirit of the nation and that, for this reason, had to be faced by all means.
Counterrevolution

• This is the model to which were inspired the Argentine military after the coup. The repression was carried out with an increase in actions against the guerrillas and the social groups that supported it. In particular, with the actions of clandestine teams. Special Forces units kidnapped, interrogated, tortured suspected members of subversive organizations and left wing supporters.
Counterrevolution

- They were illegally detained and often were not set free. When relatives turned to the police for news, they got evasive answers. The military Junta wanted to avoid the consequences of the coup in Chile, where there had been an open repression, with murderers in broad day light after the coup of September 11, 1973, murderers which had caused protests and condemnation at the international level.
Counterrevolution

• In the plans of the Argentine Junta, the annihilation of subversion was to be implemented with the least possible publicity. Hence the choice of the disappearances, and the occultation of bodies. The disappeared persons were “absent forever”, as general Viola said, when was enacted the law authorizing family members of the disappeared to obtain a declaration of presumed death of those who had disappeared between November 1974 and December 1979.
Counterrevolution

- Relatives of the missing persons turned to people they knew in State and military apparatus, the church, to international organizations for the protection of human rights. In 1980, an investigation led by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS, found the military leadership responsible for the establishment of units engaged in the disappearances, but the government explained in other way the fate of the disappeared.
Counterrevolution

• They were, according to the government:
  • - victims of terrorist acts;
  • - fugitives without the knowledge of family members;
  • - common names prevalent in Spanish-speaking countries;
  • - prisoners who for security reasons could not be freed;
  • - victims during clashes with police.
Counterrevolution

- At that time, it was carried out a broad international campaign to shed light on what was happening in Argentina, with information campaigns, support for the Argentine associations at home and in exile. United States, under President Carter, took part in the campaign. In 1980 Adolfo Pérez Esquivel, a human rights activist, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
In October of 1979 there was the first pope’s intervention on behalf of victims of dictatorships, after the insistence of some “Madres de Plaza de Mayo”, the organization that brought together the families of the disappeared: the pontiff said publicly that it was shed light on the fate of prisoners and disappeared.
Counterrevolution

- All this did not prevent the conduct of an event, in 1978, which gave a big boost to the regime: the World Football Cup, awarded to the country a few years before. The competition took place in a climate of great popular enthusiasm, with the military regime looked with satisfaction at the international recognition caused by this event.
The national team started well, but lost with Italy. In the semi-final round drew with Brazil. To pass to the final, Argentina had to win Peru by scoring a lot of goals. They won 6-0, the size of the score left some doubt on the regularity of the game. The national team won the World Cup defeating Netherlands, and millions of people celebrated the victory in the streets.
Counterrevolution

• In 1982, the Junta, with the failure of the policy of openness towards the opposition and in a terrible economic crisis, moreover internally divided on economic policy choices, decided to play the patriotism card: the invasion of the island Malvinas - Falkland, occupied by G. Britain in 1832.
Counterrevolution

- Great Britain recaptured the islands in a few weeks. In the following months the military gradually withdrew from the government. The regime replaced general Galtieri with Bignone, who promised free elections for the following year. The Government of Bignone lasted sixteen months, just the time to negotiate the transition with representatives of civil society and issue decrees that would ensure the impunity of the military.
The transition to democracy

- At the end of 1983, the UCR candidate Raúl Alfonsín won the presidential election. It was the beginning of a long transition to democracy.
The transition to democracy

• Alfonsín decreed the annulment of the Ley de Pacificación Nacional that the military had issued to secure their impunity, law considered morally unacceptable. It was decided that the alleged responsible for the disappearances had to be judged by a military court, against whose judgments they could resort to a ordinary court.
The transition to democracy

- Military refused this system; jurisdiction passed to the civil justice system. The Ley de obedienza debida was enacted: officers and subordinates, who had carried out the orders received, could not be prosecuted.
The transition to democracy

• In December 1983 Conadep, the Commission of inquiry into the disappearance of people during the dictatorship, led by writer Ernesto Sabato, was created. The commission, after a work of three years, published a report that documented the disappearance of 10,000 people out of 30,000 cases reported.
The transition to democracy

- It was underlined that many victims had nothing to do with terrorists, they were just members of political parties or trade unions, intellectuals, relatives, or friends included in the phone book of any suspects. 57% of the victims were between twenty and thirty years old.
The transition to democracy

• The issue of judicial persecution of human rights violations occurred during the dictatorship presented as a dilemma, not only in Argentina.
The transition to democracy

• A trend, going back to a logical ethics, suggested the path of truth at all costs, with the extension of the investigations and the identification of the greatest possible quantity of charges.
The transition to democracy

• Another trend, more realistic, considered impossible to effective prosecution of all perpetrators, given the enormous resistance that would be encountered not only in the military but also in civil society that had supported the regime.
The transition to democracy

• From this point of view, a search for the truth at all costs would be dangerous: the idea of punishing the main responsible leaders, but without penalizing the entire military establishment prevailed. This meant that many people remained unpunished and in somehow helped forgetfulness and general impunity.
The transition to democracy

• In fact, it was carried on an ambiguous policy, with influence of both trends, made up of moments of firmness and other of excessive concessions.
The transition to democracy

- The trial, which began in April 1985, brought to life imprisonment in December 1985 of General Videla and Admiral Massera. Other senior officers, as Galtieri, were absolved. Forty senior officers retired from active service, the number of generals was reduced from sixty to twenty-five. Fifty thousand recruits, three-quarters of active service, were dismissed. Some barracks were closed and many troops were removed from Buenos Aires, the center of political power.
The transition to democracy

- The Alfonsín government enacted in 1986 the *Ley de punto Final*, setting a limit of sixty days to promote prosecutions against those suspected of crimes in the ‘70s repression. Thousands of people protested in the streets; however, the parliament approved it. This shows the influence the military had on political power, and how much attention was given to them by society.
The transition to democracy

- Episodes of insubordination occurred in 1985, so that Alfonsín declared a state of siege, after it was discovered a military plot to overthrow the government. In 1987 the carapintadas, members of a special army unit, rebelled; April 16 an army major accused of human rights violations barricaded himself in a barrack in Córdoba,
The transition to democracy

- supported by Lieutenant Colonel Aldo Rico, who in turn rebelled in the barrack of Campo de Mayo, near the capital. The President went to the barrack and forced the rebels to surrender. Then he removed the commander in chief of the armed forces, following a request of the rebels.
The transition to democracy

• On January 14, 1988, there was a new insurrection led by Colonel Rico, who occupied Monte Caseros, a town on the border with Uruguay. Rico, hero of the Malvinas - Falkland, asked for the recognition of the work of military during the war against terrorism and the end of the campaign of defamation against the protagonists of that period.
The transition to democracy

- These attempts expressed the military discontent regarding the position the army assumed during the transition period. The protagonists of these uprisings were not directly responsible for the crimes of the dictatorship, but officers who fought in Malvinas war, people who had supported the guerra sucia, and who now did not accept the downsizing of the armed forces, neither trials which cast discredit on the whole military institution.
The transition to democracy

• In July 1989, the Peronist candidate, Carlos Menem, became the new president of the republic. In October, he announced the granting of forgiveness for about three hundred soldiers, of which thirty-nine still on trial for violation of human rights and one hundred sixty-four, including Rico and Seineldín, involved in attempts at insurrection.
The transition to democracy

- The measure did not include Generals Videla, Viola, Lambruschini, nor the guerrilla leaders. There was a new uprising in the late 1990s, on the eve of Bush’s visit. When Menem issued a forgiveness act that gave the freedom to life imprisonment, there were street protests.
Truth and justice

• *The desaparecidos issue comes back*

• In the mid-nineties, some officers made confessions about tortures and mode of disappearance of the victims during the dictatorship. According to this new versions, thousands of prisoners were narcotized, naked, loaded onto airplanes and thrown into the ocean.
Truth and justice

- In Italy, the investigation into the disappearance of some Italian citizens had begun in 1983. In 1994, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation closed the investigation for lack of cooperation of the Argentine authorities.
Truth and justice

• In August 1996, the Italian Minister of Justice urged for reopening the case. In June 1998 the investigating judge accepted the request of the Italian government to sue for damages in the trial for the Italian disappeared (Argentines of Italian origin)
Truth and justice

• Also in Spain were initiated judicial proceedings on the disappearance of hundreds of Spanish citizens. The Spanish prosecutor has managed to witness even Isabelita Perón, the last president before the coup of ‘76, who had endorsed, during his rule, persecution of suspected terrorists and guerrilla supporters, enacting decrees that were later used by the military to justify all kinds of abuse
Truth and justice

• On March 25, 1997, the judge issued an order of arrest of General Galtieri for the disappearance of three Spanish citizens. The Argentine government denied any kind of collaboration. In France, in 1990, was sentenced “in absentia” the Argentine army captain Alfredo Astiz for the kidnapping and death of two French nuns.
Truth and justice

• One of the cases discussed in Italy involved the disappearance of a girl arrested during pregnancy, whose daughter was taken away immediately after birth. The girl was killed, her daughter was given to adoptive parents. In fact, in Argentina there have been several cases like this.
Truth and justice

• These news, and the recent confessions, have given strength to the movement of grandmothers, “Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo”, whose goal is to find at all costs and return back the identity to those taken away from natural mothers and given to other people
Truth and justice

- The trials that took place in other states, in particular, in Spain, contributed to the reopening of the debate on whether it was possible an international prosecution of the crimes committed and their nature: crimes against humanity, crimes for ever prosecutable, without time limit. Spanish General Attorney confirmed the jurisdiction of the magistrate to investigate human rights violations carried out on Spanish citizens during the dictatorship in Argentina (and Chile).
Truth and justice

- On 6 December 2000 the Court of Appeal of Rome sentenced to life imprisonment generals Mason and Riveros and twenty-four years in prison several military for the murder of seven Italians and taking away an child new born to the mother.
Truth and justice

• The return of democracy in Latin America, particularly in the Southern Cone, it should be so analyzed taking into account two different periods, which correspond to two distinct issues: the transition to democracy period and the consolidation of democratic institutions.
Truth and justice

- The collapse of authoritarian regimes was caused by the failure of economic policies, which had undermined the consensus they enjoyed, and by promoting human rights activities on the part of the church, trade unions, associations of free citizens, international institutions.
Truth and justice

• The return to democracy alone is not enough to secure by new authoritarian regressions: the success of the economic policies implemented by the governments during transition is essential to ensure stability at the same democratic framework.
Truth and justice

• In Chile, economic reforms preceded the transition itself, so as to perceive the economic results achieved by the Pinochet regime as a positive legacy of the authoritarian period.
Truth and justice

- The consolidation of the democratic context reduced the weight of the military, through a reduction of their role in the political struggle, and by reducing the military expenditure. In any case, the relationship between civil and military can evolve in different ways, depending on the country.
Truth and justice

• The experience of Argentina’s democratic transition seems paradigmatic: on the one hand, the attempt to bring the army in the role according to the constitution, thus preventing the return of the military to power; and second, the attempt to shed light on the years of the dictatorship, avoiding to submit to process the whole military establishment.
Truth and justice

• The committed crimes were too many and too well-known to the international public to be silenced. In Argentina, the two trends have coexisted, that of punishment at all costs and that of reconciliation at all costs. The treatment of alleged offenders has followed the vicissitudes of domestic politics, especially the course of military revolts.
The indigenous problem

- The society created in America was initially divided between Europeans and Indians: a república de los españoles, a república de los Indios.
The indigenous problem

- The society created in America was initially divided between Europeans and Indians: república de los españoles, república de los Indios. In the organic conception of society, those were two parts belonging to the same body, the Respublica Christiana, which had its origin in God and was ruled by a Catholic monarch, under whose government the well-ordered society, political society.
The indigenous problem

• The American world ruled by Europeans participated in the same order and was divided into the two republics: the first is directly inspired by the Spanish institutions, the authority of the empire and included subjects from Europe and their descendants; the second included the native population, which could fully integrate in the first community, eventually, by assimilating Spanish education and evangelization.
The indigenous problem

• The differentiation was necessary, given that the natives were considered free subjects, but in need of protection and guardianship, not already able to govern themselves.
The indigenous problem

- The introduction of European political government elements took place gathering Indians in villages next to the Spanish ones, where they could preserve their own laws and traditions, when not in conflict with the Spanish laws. The corregidor de indios administered justice and protected the natives from external abuse. The missionary (or parish priest) ensured the spread of Christian doctrine and made possible the evangelization.
The indigenous problem

- The rigid division of Spanish society into two separate republics, lasted in fact only a limited time, because it was dominated by the prevalence of intermediate situations that influenced the ethnic composition, mainly due to two factors. First, the tendency of the Indians to live into urban areas created by the Spaniards, who were to perform the work they were forced to do, and also, for the expansion of the influence of the European model of life in areas inhabited mainly by Indians.
The indigenous problem

• Secondly, the increasing mixing of races, to which the African element contributed. Despite this progressive nuance of the boundaries between different ethnic groups, the institutional division between Spanish society and indigenous remained until the end of the colonial period, affecting the subsequent social order of Independent States.
The indigenous problem

- The policy of concentration of Indians in settlements closer to those Spaniards responded both to economic criteria, for their better economic utilization, and to the needs of good governance. In Spanish city founded in the New World there were districts entirely inhabited by Indians.
The indigenous problem

- Indigenous authorities did not ever disappear, as mentioned above, because in some cases were officially invested by the Spaniards of tasks and responsibilities, for which they received awards and grants, and help to consolidate their power and prestige over native population, also because in this way it was ensured a better control of labour force.
The indigenous problem

• The status of the Indians was “a special status” for the whole period of European presence, resulting from the intentions of Christianization and Hispanization, security and protection, but also by the need for labor exploitation.
The indigenous problem

- Spanish institutions assumed a paternalistic attitude, treating the Indian as a minor of age, a helpless. The Spanish crown created a legal system and a specific organization to ensure this. The term of the time to express the Indian condition was *miserable*, a person who inspired compassion and, at the same time, required a special protection. To this category belong the orphans, the widows, the pilgrims, all of whom enjoyed some legal privileges.
The indigenous problem

• The Indians, as miserable, were treated as children, as poor men, and needed someone who could defend and assist them. It was specifically created the role of protector of the Indians, which was to enforce the operation of the protection system, to correct abuses, to promote initiatives in their defense.
The indigenous problem

• The protector did not intervene in all legal cases, but only in those in which it assumed that a Spaniard (a native lord or another indio) made an abuse against an indio. The viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo, in the seventies of the sixteenth century, realizing that it was necessary to simplify the administration of justice within the borders of corregimiento, allowed that in the first instance the judges were native judges.
The indigenous problem

- The *protectores* had to enforce the rights of the natives in front of other degrees of justice.
- The legal situation of the Indians remained the same throughout the colonial period.
The Indians in the Republic of Peru (XIX c.)

- The 1812 census in Peru, made a few years before the start of the war of independence, calculated the Peruvian population in a million and a half people, so divided by race: 178,000 Spaniards, 954,000 Indians, 287,000 mestizos, mulattoes, and 90,000 slaves. So, in front of a 12 % of the of European origin population, there was a more than 63 % of the Indians, while the mestizos accounted for about 20 %.
The Indians in the Republic of Peru (XIX c.)

- Since declaration of independence, General San Martin, in 1822, had ordered that the Indians were exempted from obligatory services as the *mita*, (corvée) and any other service they performed against their will. The liberal principles inherent in the Republican legislation destroyed the system of forced labour which the Indians were subjected, but also all the guarantees of their ancient status and of their property that the monarchy had established over the centuries, unacceptable in the new liberal regime.
The Indians in the Republic of Peru (XIX c.)

• Bolívar in 1824, with various acts, abolished the tribute, then declared the Indians owners of their lands, also free to sell them (this meant that they were often deceived). A provision of June 1825 made the Indians equal to other citizens in respect of taxes; decided a twenty-five years inalienability of lands received under the decree of the previous year; established the division modes of community lands.
The intention of Bolívar was to create a broad and solid social base of landowners, as backbone of the new Peruvian State, as many other I.a. republics. However, landowners took advantage of the law, taking possession of the Indian lands, through the manipulation of the legal system. The first action taken by the Peruvian government when Bolívar left, was the surreptitious restoration of the tax, with the name of contribución indígena, indigenous contribution.
The Indians in the Republic of Peru (XIX c.)

- Subsequent historical events contributed to the removal of the Indian issue from the national political debate. The peasant uprisings, which saw the native population as protagonist, set off several times during the nineteenth century, and made upper classes think about the last great indigenous uprising of the colonial period, that of Tupac Amaru (1780). In fact, nineteenth century Indian revolts in the sierra had a much more limited extent than those in the late eighteenth century; however appeared as dangerous rebellions.
The Indians in the Republic of Peru (XIX c.)

• The government of Lima exercised a reduced power over the owners of the vast farms of the sierra. The landowners were really free in their territories, without any external authority controlling them. The lands belonging to indigenous communities were repeatedly invaded by small landowners, with the result that the Indians, on the one hand they had to pay state taxes with their work, on the other hand tried to resist the gamonalism offensive.
The XX c. in Peru: Manuel González Prada

• Manuel González Prada (1844-1918)
The XX c. in Peru: Manuel González Prada

• The political and cultural reflection on native people re-emerged at the end of XIX century. The war lost by Peru against Chile (1879-1883) led to a discussion on the indigenous question in connection with the national one. Manuel González Prada (1844-1918), essayist and poet, faced many political and cultural themes with liberal, anticlerical and positivist spirit.
The XX c. in Peru : Manuel González Prada

• The starting point of his analysis was the moral and social disaster produced by the military defeat during the War of the Pacific. The Peruvian army, on paper stronger, because far more numerous, had been overwhelmed because of the deep division between the officers and the troop, composed mostly of conscripts Indians, Quechua and Aymara speaking, with no conceivable reason to fight a war in the desert areas in dispute.
The opportunity to discuss the issue occurred when, in 1888, a national collection was organized to redeem the provinces of Tacna and Arica, delivered for ten years to Chile, in accordance with the Treaty of Ancon. Students of Lima organized a demonstration in the old Politeama theatre, to which González Prada was invited. In the speech he had prepared and that he made a child read, he identified the main cause of the defeat in the lack of a common national consciousness and the inability to develop it, due to exploitation which indios were subjected:
“The real winners, the real weapons of the enemy was our ignorance and our spirit of bondage again... with the armies of Indians undisciplined and without freedom, Peru will always be defeated. If we make Indians into servant, what nation will they defend? Like medieval serfs, they will only fight for a feudal lord... The real Peru the is not formed by Creoles and foreigners who live in the strip of land lying between the Andes and the Pacific; the nation is made up by the multitude of Indians spread across the Eastern slopes the mountains...
…After three hundred years the Indian lives in the lower strata of human society, as a hybrid with the vices of the barbarian without the virtues of the European. Teach him to read and write, and you will see whether or not in a quarter of a century he will rise to the dignity of a man. To you, schoolteachers, falls the task of galvanizing a race that sleeps under a brutalizing tyranny".
There was no one who could solve the issue peacefully, in a way that would be inevitably paternalistic, pedagogical, and ultimately authoritarian:
“The condition of the Indians can be improved in two ways: either the heart of the oppressors is moved to the point of recognizing the right of the oppressed, or the mind of the oppressed acquires enough virility to beat the oppressors. If the Indians spare in rifles and bullets what they spend on alcohol and parties, would change their condition, they would respect their property and their life.
...They would respond to violence with violence, punishing the boss who steals the wool, the soldier who recruit on behalf of the government, the thief who steals cattle. Do not preach humility to the native, but pride and rebellion. What he has gained in three or four hundred years of tolerance and patience? ...
The XX c. in Peru: Manuel González Prada

• There is a detector factor: greater prosperity reigns in areas more distant from the large haciendas, you can feel greater order and tranquillity in the villages less frequented by the authorities. In short, the Indian will redeem by his own efforts, not because their oppressors become more human. Each white man is, more or less, a Pizarro, a Valverde, or a Areche”. 
The XX c. in Peru

In 1922, during the government of Agustín Leguía, under the Ministry of Public Works was created the Patronato de la Raza Indígena. This institution, headed by a council presided over by the Lima’s Archbishop, thanks to the presence on the territory of local offices, was to remedy abuse of the owners, secure legal channels for peasant claims to avoiding revolts, controlling the application of laws for the Indians, protect the rights of Indian communities.
The XX c. in Peru

• Among the other purposes of the Patronato was the cultural development of indians, with special attention to the resolution of the problem of alcoholism, extremely widespread. The Patronato received several critical reports about the abuses of *gamonales* and the harmful effects of road conscription, but without concrete results. According to one of these reports, published in 1926 in the Bulletin of Indigenous Affairs, two-thirds of complaints and grievances were related to the theft or misappropriation of individual or communal lands.
The XX c. in Peru

• These complaints remained mostly without success, because the accused defended themselves showing fake documents, but with all the appearance of legality, in which appeared the sale of land. The ignorance of the Indians, together with the complicity of some notaries, allowed this type of fraud. The offices of Patronato had no power to deal with these frauds, because they could not annul acts apparently legal. The other complaints related to theft of livestock, crops stolen, ill-treatment, missed payments of wages, cases easier to solve.
The Patronato had a clear paternalistic approach, in which co-existed a desire to protect the ignorant and helpless masses and the need to create minimum conditions for living together with the owners and the other forms of agricultural power; moreover, attempted to spread literacy and technical education.
The XX c. in Peru

• Since 1924, the disillusionment with Leguía because of the repression he made of some peasant revolts and the emergence of the authoritarian character of his political project, provoked a new alliance at the local level, including intellectuals and university professors, students, members of the small and middle class and popular sectors.
The XX c. in Peru

- Expressions of these cultural innovations were the student group “Andes” and the magazine “Kosko”. It was the phase of the true indigenism: the awareness for the indigenous intellectuals of the state of backwardness of the sierra population, and the need to spread the cultural tools for self-defense of individuals. In a second step, the Cusco indigenist movement split, due to the emergence of two new parties on the national scene capable to incorporate into their political platform the battles fought by local groups: the Communist Party, with the name of Partido socialista peruano, and Apra.
José Carlos Mariátegui

• José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930)
José Carlos Mariátegui

• According to the communist thinker José Carlos Mariátegui (1894-1930), Peru, in the middle of the twentieth century, was characterized by the coexistence of three economies: the capitalist economy of the coast, the semi-feudal interior controlled by gamonales (landowners), communist indigenous communities.
José Carlos Mariátegui

• In the interior economy, the semifeudal characters were identified in the absence of a wage regime for all workers, in the low concern of owners for the effective productivity of the cultivated land, because they were sure to be able to count on, however, a certain profit margin from sale of products for which the labor factor, the Indian labor, was at a very low cost.
José Carlos Mariátegui

- The environment of the large estates still retained the character of a self-sufficient microcosm, in which the hacendado acted as father and master, by exercising formal and informal rights, buying up the best land, deciding how to market products, using ancient customs and servitudes.
José Carlos Mariátegui

• The result, according to Mariátegui, was that the indigenous problem arose from Peruvian economy and had roots in the system of land ownership.

• In this way, Mariátegui reduced the indigenous problem to the problem of the land. He focused the attention on the one hand on the large estates, considered as a strong element of feudal capitalism, on the other on indian communities, in which were inherent ancient elements of communism, and on which it was possible to build the new system.
José Carlos Mariátegui

- The old class of landowners had never lost his domain, the policy of offering for sale the confiscated lands ended to the owners’ benefit and to the detriment of the Indian communities. The feudal system was strengthened by the persistence of Indian serfdom, settled at the time of the conquest, and with the use of institutions that formally resumed Inca time, as in the case of road conscription (one of the duties of incaic *mita*).
In this way, the agrarian problem was presented as an essentially economic and social, and therefore political, problem. It could not be resolved as a technical matter. The classic liberal solution, consistent and applied in many European countries, according to the knowledge of the thinker, the splitting of large estates and the limited extension of new agricultural property, such as 500 acres, could work, in theory, but now it’s was to late, in Peru, cause the problem solution was already present in the legacy of the past:
“Consistently with my ideological position, I think that the time to experiment in Peru liberal methods, individualistic forms, has passed. Leaving aside the doctrinal reasons, I consider this essential factor undeniable and concrete which gives a peculiar character to our agrarian problem: the survival of the community and the practical elements of socialism in agriculture and indigenous life”.
José Carlos Mariátegui

• The people who made up the Inca empire had always been farmers, normally devoted to agriculture and sheep-farming. Industries, arts, had a domestic and rural character. The great incaic public works, such as irrigation canals, terraces along the slopes of the mountains, bridges, roads, attested the high degree of incaic economic organization, aimed at better efficiency of the agrarian economy. The Inca communism had very specific characteristics:
• “collective ownership of agricultural land cultivable by the *ayllu* (set of families with kinship ties), although divided into individual and non-transferable lots; collective ownership of the water, pastures and forests, by the set of *ayllu* settled around a same town; joint cooperation in the work; individual appropriation of crops and fruits”.

José Carlos Mariátegui

• The indigenous community inherited the *ayllu*, a still alive organism which, despite being surrounded by a hostile environment, could evolve positively. The indigenous community was a system of production that kept among its members, linked by kinship and solidarity, elements required to ensure an optimal productivity.
Moreover, the persistence of those bonds of cooperation and solidarity was the best condition for the acquisition of new techniques and the improvement of production. In this sense, the future was not the fragmentation of large property in many individual properties, but the passage of the land to the communities.
The indigenist continental congresses

• In the Final Declaration of the First Indigenous Congress held in Patzcuaro, Mexico, in 1940, recognized the extent of the continental indigenous problem. One of the goals of the Congress was the evaluation, both qualitative and quantitative, of the indigenous population, and of the living conditions, country by country.
The indigenist continental congresses

• The conclusions were:
  • -the indigenous problem was of public interest and relevance, because it appeared, to a greater or lesser extent, in all regions of the continent;
  • -its solution presupposes the exercise of solidarity, considered necessary among the American countries that, in their vast majority, had similar problems.
The indigenist continental congresses

• According to the International Labor Organization, in 1941 the total indigenous population of the Americas was divided as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Mainly indigenous</th>
<th>Indig. Pop. total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>108.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groenlandia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>394.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras (Belize)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Brit.</td>
<td>2.565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3193</td>
<td>2.661</td>
<td>5.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1.299.927</td>
<td>324.981</td>
<td>1.624.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>171.952</td>
<td>295.616</td>
<td>467.568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4.620.886</td>
<td>4.040.590</td>
<td>8.661.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>212.706</td>
<td>159.529</td>
<td>372.235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>42.897</td>
<td>124.791</td>
<td>167.688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>287.522</td>
<td>503.163</td>
<td>790.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>38.425</td>
<td>150.000</td>
<td>188.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.800.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>1.250.000</td>
<td>2.027.265</td>
<td>3.277.265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana brit.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>101.118</td>
<td>553.401</td>
<td>654.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>250.000</td>
<td>1,962.750</td>
<td>2,212.750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana dutch</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,600.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana french.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>142.000</td>
<td>300.000</td>
<td>442.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>5,000.000</td>
<td>1,500.000</td>
<td>6,500.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>136.147</td>
<td>402.000</td>
<td>538.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,836.865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The indigenist continental congresses

- Data were very approximate, as they had to take account of ethnicity, difficult to identify, also difficult to quantify due to the lack of accurate census within the various states, as well as of cultural belonging, more elusive due to its characteristics; Moreover, with many doubtful cases.

- The Inter-American Indigenous Institute, in 1962, published the results of a more accurate search, which produced a figure of just over fourteen million Indians:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Indigenous</th>
<th>Total Pop.</th>
<th>Percent. on total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>202,000</td>
<td>18,238,247</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>183,000,000</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>1,237,217</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1,497,261</td>
<td>3,592,283</td>
<td>41.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>107,800</td>
<td>1,949,858</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3,030,254</td>
<td>34,625,903</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>1,470,993</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>62,187</td>
<td>1,075,541</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>2,501,259</td>
<td>3.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>20,956,039</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2,180,000</td>
<td>3,462,000</td>
<td>62.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brasil</td>
<td>99,700</td>
<td>67,000,000</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>240,000</td>
<td>7,550,991</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>15,200,000</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>643,078</td>
<td>4,298,449</td>
<td>14.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>68,000</td>
<td>1,768,448</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>4,838,590</td>
<td>10,364,620</td>
<td>46.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>98,823</td>
<td>6,709,139</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,149,431</td>
<td>385,000</td>
<td>% 3.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The indigenist continental congresses

- In the II Interamerican Indigenist Congress, held in Cusco in 1948, the Mexican anthropologist Alfonso Caso presented a report focusing on the definition of indio, who was indio, which were the elements to define someone as indio. Starting from the observation that four centuries of miscegenation had made the population extremely mixed, hybrid, anywhere on the continent, he observed that was impossible to determine who was indio in absolute terms. he identified, however, a few things to keep in mind.
The indigenist continental congresses

- The first element was strictly ethnic, although stated: “We can not fall into the common mistake of believing in the existence of an indigenous race, taking the word in a biological sense, with automatically psychic, social and economic consequences. We can talk about indigenous race, just as we can speak of a white race or black race - because - the somatic differences among the indigenous people of America are large as those existing within the European and African populations”.
The indigenist continental congresses

• The hybridisation process was so widespread that it is impossible to say whether or not a person had facial features to classify it into a category.”
The indigenist continental congresses

• The second element was the culture. Many people because of their education were mestizos, as originally belonging to a culture, the indigenous, which adapted and then modified European elements or techniques. In addition, there were objects and popular uses in indigenous villages, many of them of European derivation, especially in the field of clothing. Therefore, “it is not enough that a cultural element is of indigenous origin to classify as Indians those who use it, nor is it sufficient that it is of European origin to include those who use it in the category of ‘white’ ”.
The indigenist continental congresses

- A third element, typically cultural, according to Alfonso Caso, was to be evaluated separately: language. Language, normally transmitted from early childhood by the mother, was the main tool to recognize who was Indian, though the immigrants in the city try to hide their origin trying to speak the European language in the presence of strangers, and denying the knowledge of local languages:
The indigenist continental congresses

• “A man always prefers to speak the language of the group which feels to belong. But these indigenous idioms are languages that whites have always regarded as an expression of cultural inferiority; so we can say that if a man uses only an indigenous language, for that reason is an Indian”. The criterion of language is not appropriate, on the opposite, to identify as Indians who speak two languages, or only Spanish.
The indigenist continental congresses

• The fourth element seemed to be decisive: the consciousness to belong, or not, to an indigenous group:

• “Every person who feels to belong to an indigenous community, which conceives of itself as indigenous, is an indio”.
The indigenist continental congresses

- This group consciousness exists, in fact, only when someone accepts fully the culture of the group. When they have the same ethical, aesthetic, social and political ideals, and when they share collective sentiments and willingly cooperate with the actions and reactions of the community. In short, indios are those who feel they belong to an indigenous community.
The indigenist continental congresses

- Element to be taken into account in this case: the consciousness of belonging to a group deemed inferior by the dominant society could curb the explicit manifestation of this membership.
With the application of these four criteria, it was possible to find persons that corresponded to the definition of ‘indio’, but this did not mean purity of race and culture. If someone did not have the awareness of being Indian, he could not be considered as indio: in this case the mestizo element prevailed. This was the case for many individuals and groups in Mexico, Peru, and elsewhere.
The indigenist continental congresses

- From the point of view of applied anthropology, the problem was not so much to identify the Indian as an individual, but as belonging to an indigenous community, namely “the complex of individuals living within a cultural model, who feel to belong to an indigenous culture”.
These considerations had become the common heritage of the social sciences with a consequent transfer on political decisions. The census of 1940 classified the Peruvian inhabitants according to race and language, identifying the categories of white, Indian, mestizo, black. Regarding the racial category, the decision to put a person into one or another category was left to the choice of the census operator, or to the answer of the surveyed person. It was ascribed to the category of mixed race anyone who did not seem to have a definite connotation.
But the same report attached to the census stated that it was often impossible to distinguish clearly between white and mestizo. The data were as follows: in Peru, of a total population of 6,207,967 people, there were whites and mestizos to 3.28336 million, accounting for 52.89%; Indians 2,847,196, accounting for 45.86%; yellow (Chinese and Japanese) 41,945, or 0.68%; 29,054 blacks, or 0.47%; unspecified 6412, 0.10%.
The data concerning the mestizos were, according to some authors, combined with data about the Indians, because the fact of speaking Spanish, living in urban contexts or dressing European clothes did not make them necessarily mestizos, in this way the indigenous population would reach 5 million, 70% of the total.
Peruvian Indigenist Institute

• The aggregate data of whites and mestizos was criticized, because it would have been better to differentiate at least among mestizos of Indian culture, *indomestizos*, and mestizos of European culture, *blancomestizos*, as well as the presence of Indians with European somatic features in the interior provinces, who spoke only Quechua.
The vast majority of indigenous communities was located in the departments of Cusco and Puno, and the census of 1940 had indicated the number of 4685 community. All this brought back the attention not so much to the identification of indium as such, but to the individual in the community, the latter being understood both in a broad sense, as human and social environment of reference, and in a strict sense, as an entity legally recognized by the State.
The 1957 I.L.O. Convention

- At the international level, this aspect is largely taken into account in the International Labour Organization (ILO) activity. The Convention 107 of 1957, on integration and protection of indigenous peoples, established the basic principles that should guide the policy of each state and made explicit reference to the indigenous peoples, considered as people descended from populations which inhabited the country before European conquest and colonization.
The 1957 I.L.O. Convention

• In addition to establishing that the task of the state policies were the protection, and full social, economic and cultural integration in the national society, the Convention recognized forms of indigenous organization, as well as the existence of indigenous customary law, when not in conflict with the State law.
The 1957 I.L.O. Convention

• The Convention, moreover, recognized individual and collective property rights over the lands traditionally occupied, and prohibited population displacements, except in exceptional cases. There were also references to compliance with certain minimum conditions of employment, the obligation to extend to indigenous health systems, and guarantees of access to the education system.
The 1957 I.L.O. Convention

- The document came into force in 1959, was ratified by several Latin American countries, including Peru. He had primarily a function of recommendation, at the international level, for governments invested by the indigenous problem, to follow as far as possible references in the document.
The 1989 I.L.O. Convention

• In the eighties, the ILO Convention 107 the Convention was revised. Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries was adopted in 1989 and became valid in 1991. Out of 18 countries that have ratified the Convention until 2007, 12 are Latin American countries.
The 1989 I.L.O. Convention

- Main new features: it abandons the term “population” replaced by “people”; recognition of collective rights, the right to preserve their legal and customary rules if they are compatible with the national legal system; another new element: the consciousness of one’s own identity is decisive to decide to which group it’s possible to apply the provisions of the Convention.
UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, 2007

- UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, 2007, follows ILO Convention 169, with the novelty of: explicit recognition of the right to self-determination (then modified by the UN General Assembly, which speaks of being able to freely determine their relationships with States, to which they belong) and the collective nature of indigenous rights: the right to land, territory and natural resources, the recognition of the rights deriving from historical treatises.
Ethnopopulism in L.A.

- Latin America had long been the one region in the world without major ethnic parties. In recent years, however, important parties that are based to varying degrees in the indigenous population have emerged in the region. The most successful of these movements have been ethno-populist parties - that is, parties that combine an inclusive ethnic appeal with a traditional populist platform.
**Ethnopopulism in L.A.**

- Ethno-populist parties and leaders have won significant legislative or presidential victories in several of the Andean countries in the last few years. In Bolivia, for example, Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) won a resounding victory in the 2005 presidential elections.
Ethnopopulism in L.A.

• The MAS has sought to appeal to the indigenous population, but it has tried to do so without alienating white and mestizo voters. Thus, it has avoided exclusionary rhetoric, recruited non-indigenous as well as indigenous candidates and formed alliances with a variety of indigenous and non-indigenous organizations.
Ethnopopulism in L.A.

• At the same time, the MAS has used classical populist strategies, such as denouncing the traditional parties, market-oriented policies, and foreign intervention, to win the support of both indigenous and nonindigenous voters. This strategy have enabled the MAS to set up a coalition of indigenous voters, poor people, union activists, the politically disenchanted, and people with leftist, statist, and nationalist views.
Ethnopopulism in L.A.

• In Ecuador, Pachakutik helped elect Lucio Gutiérrez president in 2002, although the party subsequently broke with his administration. Subsequently, Rafael Correa has been able to use the indigenists movements in his favor, but in a relationship often controversial.
Ethnopopulism in L.A.

• Finally, in Peru, an ethno-populist leader, Ollanta Humala, won a surprising victory in the first round of the presidential elections in 2006 before losing narrowly in the second round, then won elections in 2011.