From Washington Consensus to BeST Consensus for world development

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While the set of liberalising and fiscally conservative development precepts dubbed the ‘Washington Consensus’ are now discredited as a tool for development, there is as yet no widely adopted or accepted alternative other than references to the ‘East Asian model’. In this paper, we distil the essence of the experience of East Asia—of Japan initially, then of Korea and Taiwan, and now of China—in a set of flexible precepts that we suggest underpin the policies and strategies pursued with success by these East Asian economies. In the spirit of proposing an alternative to the Washington Consensus, we suggest that these precepts—pragmatic and known to work—be dubbed the Beijing–Seoul–Tokyo Consensus (or BeST Consensus for development). The essence of this consensus is its focus on capability building, on dynamic transitions from one stage to the next, and on building an institutional platform to capture latecomer effects. We outline what this BeST Consensus might be and discuss why it is that its elements appear to work so well; and whether they can still be applied in the world of 21st-century conditions.

Introduction

The recent upheaval in global financial markets and now in the world economy clearly calls into question the neoliberal consensus that has been enforced in Washington, and opens the way to alternatives that have long been suppressed. One of the first matters to come up for reconsideration must surely be the speculative neoliberal doctrines as to what ‘works’ for world development—the Washington Consensus (WC). Such reconsideration makes more sense as in 2009, the Leontief Prize is awarded to Robert Wade and Jose Ocampo for their work that takes the world ‘Beyond the Washington Consensus’. There is wider scholarly disquiet over the WC; for example, Rodrik (2006:974) states that the question is not whether the WC is alive or dead, but what will replace it. Therefore, it is timely and appropriate to review the grounds of the WC and to frame realistic alternatives.

The obvious alternative is the East Asian model. Wade (1992) provided an influential review of East Asia’s economic success, noting the conflicting perspectives, partial insights, and shaky evidence on which judgments had been reached. But at the same time, the Washington institutions, the IMF and the World
Bank, were vigorously promoting a very different kind of free-markets formula, dubbed in 1990 the Washington Consensus. Not even the World Bank’s (1993) *East Asian Miracle* report made much of a dent in this Consensus. Now the rise of China as one of the most successful developing countries holds the world stage. Are we any the wiser as to the sources of success in economic development?

We begin with a paradox. For the past quarter century, there have been some spectacular successes in industrial development, and some spectacular failures. The successes certainly include Korea and Taiwan, which in their different ways emulated the prior success of Japan. The current success story is certainly China, which is lifting itself out of poverty with more than 30 years of annual growth rates of 10 per cent or so. Then there are the failures. Apart from the ‘failed states’ of Africa, which are in a class of their own, there has been growth stagnation in Latin America, and some dramatic collapses such as that of Argentina in 2001. Argentina had done everything right, according to the liberal market nostrums prevalent in Washington, and yet it was punished savagely by the international financial markets.

So we may express the paradox in the following terms. The successes all departed in significant ways from the policies deemed appropriate by policy analysts in Washington; and many of the failures occurred in cases where the country followed Washington’s advice closely.

In the case of China, the most significant achievement is the country lifting itself out of poverty. World Bank data reveal that over the two decades from 1981 to 2001, the proportion of people living in poverty declined from 53 per cent to just 8 per cent (Ravallion and Chen 2007). Some at the World Bank maintain that this success is attributable to China’s opening up, as in the work of Dollar and Kraay (2002). But it is difficult to make this case when confronted by such realities as China’s still-large state sector; its sequential opening; its imposition of caps on foreign equity in joint ventures in strategic sectors; and its heavy regulation of the banking sector and foreign exchange operations. The more immediate and convincing explanation for China’s success must surely have to do with its willingness to absorb the lessons of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, while adding some elements of its own that derive from its large domestic market (Qian 2003; Lin et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2005).

This is the setting in which we wish to probe the thinking behind China’s success and that of the other northeast Asian counties such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. For the past decade and a half, the policies promoted by the Washington establishment have focused almost exclusively on maintaining a conservative macroeconomic agenda, combined with liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation—or allowing market forces to exercise more and more influence in the economy. The thinking behind this set of policy prescriptions was captured neatly in 1990 by John Williamson in the phrase the ‘Washington Consensus’.

Meanwhile, the countries of northeast Asia followed their own star. While they all maintained relatively conservative macroeconomic settings, which helped them to avoid stop-go macroeconomic cycles, they did many things that are frowned upon by the WC—such as sequential opening or liberalisation, or Taiwan and Korea’s selective opening to inward foreign direct investment (FDI). More to the point, they did many things that are not part of the WC, such as focusing their development efforts on capturing and diffusing technological capabilities in key industries that were targeted for catch-up.

In fact, it is now widely recognised that the countries that succeeded in northeast Asia followed a quite different set of prescriptions from those of Washington, with extensive targeting of industries and technologies, based on prospects for catch-up with the industrial leaders; where development was conceived in terms of acquiring and disseminating technological capabilities as quickly as possible, and where industrial development was viewed as a process that would take decades, and would involve strong commitments to invest in sectors and enterprises where returns would be negative at first but where they could be expected to turn positive eventually, and
where prices would be set to reflect development needs rather than comparative static efficiency (‘getting prices wrong’).  

If the ideas of the WC when pursued by countries led to failure, and if success was achieved by countries that ignored the WC and instead followed their own quite different set of precepts, there is a case to be made for a set of alternative prescriptions—a set that describes what the successful countries did and what the countries emulating them are doing now. Rodrik (2006:974) states that while the lessons drawn by proponents and sceptics differ, it is fair to say that nobody really believes in the WC any more, and raises the challenge of what will replace it. We agree with this formulation and accept Rodrik’s challenge.

Rodrik (2006) also argued that economic reform needs to be selective and to focus on the binding constraints on economic growth rather than take a laundry-list approach à la WC. He did not, however, identify what the binding constraints are. By contrast, a recent cross-country study by Lee and Kim (2009) identifies R&D and high education as the binding constraints to long-run growth for middle and high-income countries; whereas basic political institutions and primary education are identified as binding constraints for lower-income countries. Fagerberg and Srholec (2008) also find that capabilities related to generation and exploitation of knowledge have become much more important for economic performance recently, and that this holds not only for rich countries, but also for poorer countries, as well when such capabilities are broadly defined. Our starting point and our departure from Rodrik (2006) is that we identify capabilities as the most important binding constraint for long-term growth, and suggest policy elements to foster such capabilities over a long time horizon rather than suggest a laundry list. In this spirit, we develop a comparable set of propositions to those formulated by Williamson in 1990 (Williamson 1990) and dub them the ‘Beijing–Seoul–Tokyo Consensus’ (or BeST Consensus) for what works best for development.

In proposing the elements of this alternative consensus, our task is to capture the essence of what the East Asian countries have actually done (in their pragmatic way) rather than look for an economic purist aspiration, which is essentially what the WC is. This requires us to demonstrate a continuity between what the Japanese did, followed by the Asian Tigers (led by Korea and Taiwan), and now by China, and to do so in such a manner that the set of elements of the alternative Consensus may be seen to be coherent, complementary, plausible, and applicable widely to other developing countries today in the new global political settings of the 21st century.

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1 Amsden (1989) on Korea and Wade (2004) on Taiwan remain the best expositions of the unorthodox features involved in these countries’ successful industrialisation efforts. For more recent surveys of these and other countries’ experiences, see Amsden (2001), and on Taiwan’s experiences, see Amsden and Chu (2003).

2 For recent views on the ‘capability perspective’ in industrial development as applied in East Asia and beyond, see the collection of World Bank studies in Chandra (2006). For an influential discussion of the state strategies involved, see Kohli (2004).
It is readily seen, as in Rodrik (1996), that points 1–5 can be classified as maintenance of a secure and stable macroeconomic regime, while points 6–10 call for more marketisation of the economy (privatisation, liberalisation, and deregulation). Thus, the WC conceives economic development as essentially a movement towards the freer operation of market forces in a stable macroeconomic setting.

There is not much to object to in each individual element in the WC, as such, and all countries would want to move in that direction. But the WC is inadequate as a guide to development in three fundamental aspects. The first is its lack of recognition of economic development as a catch-up process, one that has the strategic target of closing the gap with the developed world. Linked to this is its failure to see development as a dynamic process that moves through sequential stages. And linked to both of these features is the silence of the WC on the fundamental role of capability building, which must be seen as the core of successful development and certainly the central focus of the East Asian development experiences. Let us elaborate briefly.

**Development as a process**

Latecomers see their industrial structure as one to be relentlessly changed and upgraded, with an emphasis initially on the reform and industrialisation of agriculture, followed by the building of local manufacturing industries to absorb labour displaced from agriculture. Latecomers tend to focus primarily on manufacturing as the engine of industrial development, seeking to upgrade it to the point where it becomes the primary industrial activity in the pursuit of increasing returns, or in the
industrialisation of their primary sector, as observed in Brazil.

Japan moved its industrialisation process from upstream industries progressively downward, starting with steel, petrochemicals, and heavy engineering; then moving to shipbuilding and automobiles; then to plastics and electronics. Meanwhile, its consumer goods industries began with simple products, such as clothing and footwear before moving to more complex products. A similar strategy was pursued by Korea and Taiwan; whereas Singapore was very selective in the kinds of industries that it allowed to invest in the city-state. This approach is informed by an understanding that capabilities developed in one sector can be diffused to another, but that the industrialisation process is—as the name implies—a sequence of operations and the formation and completion of one industrial bloc after another. China is following a similar strategy but on a grander scale, making use of new elements, such as its large domestic market, to facilitate the process. The WC is silent on this issue of phasing and the ripple effect of capability development through the industrialising economy.

**Development as capability enhancement**

The difference between more and less successful Asian economies can be considered in terms of the priority given to policies to enhance long-term growth potential—technology and higher education in particular—which are missing in the WC, whereas they can be considered the core elements of the approach developed in northeast Asia. A recent World Bank assessment of the reform decade of the 1990s concedes that growth entails more than efficient use of resources, and that growth-oriented actions, for example, on technological catch-up or encouragement of risk-taking for faster accumulation, may be needed (Chandra 2006). Recent studies of reform in Latin America by Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) also find that macroeconomic stability is not a sufficient condition for long-term growth, which is more closely tied to the dynamics of the production structure, and that a well-functioning broader institutional context and infrastructure are essential but generally do not play a direct role in bringing about changes in the momentum of growth (Ocampo 2005). Our point is that East Asian experience indicates that microeconomic interventions should be combined with capacity-enhancing elements (technology and education), so that the costs of distortions (rent seeking) may not be felt so heavily owing to continuing growth generating additional rents. While the northeast Asian countries have followed some of the precepts of the WC, such as managing their fiscal expenditures and tax revenues, they introduced many initiatives that are simply passed over in the formulation of the WC. Our aim is to make these points explicit as constituent elements of the BeST Consensus.

**The structure and elements of the BeST Consensus**

Williamson meant his idea of a ‘Washington consensus’ to apply to reform and development efforts throughout the American hemisphere (and no doubt beyond) in the 1990s. Likewise, we wish to imply by the BeST Consensus a set of ideas that are being applied by China today and that draw on the entire northeast Asian developmental experience (spanning Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore) and can be harnessed by most of the developing countries today—especially in South and Central Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The term is not meant to convey any geographic focus on China or even on northeast Asia. Like Williamson, we have in mind a set of ideas that can be referred to as the assumptions that underpin a set of policies. Indeed, one of the principal tasks facing any developing country today is to figure out the appropriate institutional mix and innovation required to implement the ideas and strategies that are captured in the assumptions made manifest in the BeST Consensus in ways that correspond to or complement conditions current at the time.

We start with the critical differences between developed and developing countries. While the WC sees these in terms of macroeco-
nomic settings and the priority given to market forces, we see the primary difference as residing in the agents of economic growth and their capabilities. We focus on what we see as the critical agents, namely private sector firms and public sector institutions. We view the BeST Consensus as elaborating a set of ideas as to how the capabilities of these agents may be enhanced, upgraded, aligned, and disciplined—to the point where stable macro settings and market forces can be expected to work their magic. Thus, the first two elements of the BeST Consensus in the first part, A, of Table 1 below are concerned with identifying these two fundamental agents.

Then we list four precepts in Part B of Table 1 that are focused on how to promote capabilities of private firms and industries and the reduction of risks involved for firms in entering these industries. One of the most important characteristics of the latecomer firms is being resource poor, and among the diverse resources constituting a firm, knowledge is critical in the context of capability building. Thus, arranging access to the existing knowledge base and learning opportunities is the first element in the four capability-building policies in the BeST Consensus. The next element is to promote export-based engagement with the global economy as both a means of learning capabilities and imposing discipline. The third element is targeting industries/technologies for (import-substituting) development and taking rents away from foreign companies. This is needed because to build the capabilities of private firms requires assuring them of the initial rents (profits) and learning opportunities until they grow enough to compete successfully in world markets. Target technologies are often those that are mature but formerly monopolised by foreign interests. The fourth element in the capacity building part is sequencing of industrialisation for changing/dynamic comparative advantages. This is needed because constraining activities to the capture of static comparative advantages often leads to the latecomer economies being stuck in low margin or low-value adding products. As can be seen, these four precepts are not a (laundry) list of separate elements, but all interact in placing the focus on how to enhance the capabilities of private firms.

Finally, in Part C, we enumerate four elements that enhance the institutional environment for catch-up and the structure of new

Table 1
The BeST Consensus

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<th>A. The two principal agents</th>
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<td>(1) Creating firms and building their capabilities</td>
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<td>(2) Creating pilot agencies to guide industrialisation</td>
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<td>B. Setting the process of capability enhancement in motion</td>
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<td>(1) Arranging for firms to access and leverage advanced knowledge</td>
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<td>(2) Promoting export-based engagement with the global economy to discipline firms and expand markets</td>
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<td>(3) Targeting industries/technologies for (initially import-substituting) development</td>
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<td>(4) Sequential upgrading of the leading sectors and activities to secure dynamic comparative advantages</td>
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<td>C. Creating an economic environment in which capability development will proceed</td>
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<td>(1) Building broad-based education, from primary to tertiary education</td>
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<td>(2) Creating a financial system that is catch-up friendly but cautious about external financial liberalisation</td>
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<td>(3) Establishing stable macroeconomic settings</td>
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<td>(4) Gradual phasing out of non-market interventions</td>
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industries created. First, we consider the role played by advanced education, both as a means of training people for targeted industries but also increasingly as an adjunct to knowledge generation and diffusion. The second element refers to the financial system that guides, facilitates, and disciplines the process of capability building. Only then do we consider macro stability as an element without which the process of capacity building is subject to more turbulence. Finally, the process of development and its supporting institutions needs to be wound back as a country takes its place among higher income countries—just as the scaffolding needed while a new building is being erected is later removed.

Before we elaborate on these elements, it is worth pointing out that certain preconditions must be in place. We are assuming, for example, that the rule of law applies—without it there can be no prospect for development, under the guidance of either the BeST Consensus or the WC. Likewise, we assume that there are basic institutions and infrastructure in place, such as ports for trade and regulation of such infrastructure in the form of customs, quarantine, and immigration controls. We make these a precondition, along with basic health care, housing, and sanitation, rather than an element of the BeST Consensus, since they are obviously preconditions that must be met by any developing country today. Call them elements of ‘poverty reduction’ as does the World Bank. They must not be confused with development itself.

The BeST Consensus in detail

Creating firms and building their capabilities. As opposed to building the State (as in the socialist enterprise of the 20th century) or focusing entirely on markets, the BeST Consensus begins explicitly with firms. The capacity of latecomer economies to grow capable private companies is the most important and fundamental criterion determining the success or failure of economic development or growth. They may initially be state-owned firms, where the risks for private capital are too high; but the idea is to move them towards private ownership (that is, make them ‘public’ through an IPO) as soon as possible. This condition is rarely stated explicitly, and this is the reason we make it the first element of the BeST Consensus.

If firms are the instruments of development, we see various approaches to their promotion in East Asia. In Japan and Korea, there was a model of large firms linked together in the form of business groups, called zaibatsu in Japan and chaebol in Korea (with the Japanese approach also including a bank as a central player). One way to view the phenomenon is to see the business groups as a proxy for capital markets until they develop to a certain point of maturity, and hence as efficient investment vehicles in the early stages of development. In Taiwan, the firms tended to be smaller and to be freshly minted each time there was a wave of entry into a new industry (electronics, followed by semiconductors, and in the 1990s, flat panel displays). In China, both features are evident, in the form of large state-owned enterprises and a multitude of small and medium-sized firms that originated as township and village enterprises, which efficiently absorbed rural labour from agriculture into manufacturing. The institutional foundations of firms are as necessary as their own operations: from the means for securing capital investment (such as stock markets) to the means for allowing risky ventures to be declared bankrupt if they fail. Such institutions provide the environment that supports corporate development.

Creating pilot agencies to guide industrialisation. While the ultimate goal of development is to raise the capabilities of local private companies, the process needs pilot agencies to guide and coordinate the whole process. As understood by Gerschenkron, who analysed the latecomer industrialisation of Germany and Russia, and identified latecomer agencies, such as large state-owned investment banks to drive the process in these countries, it is such agencies that can make up for gaps or lacunae in the country that is seeking to industrialise. All the northeast Asian countries built state agencies that played the role of guiding the process of industrialisation. In Japan, the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) oversaw the entire process of new industry creation and nurturing each industry to the point where it could be launched into international competition. In Korea, the institutions established in the 1960s under the Park regime included the Economic Planning Board to set economic plans, the Ministry of Trade and Industry to support industrial policy and exporting, and the Ministry of Finance to finance economic plans. In Taiwan, the institutions established under the KMT (Koumintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party) included the Central Economic Planning Board and the Industrial Development Bureau, as well as the prime technology capture and diffusion agency, the Industrial Technology Research Institute. In China today, the principal pilot agency guiding the process of industrialisation is the NDRC, which coordinates national investment plans and the development of new industries. The world’s best such agency is undoubtedly Singapore’s EDB, continuously functioning since 1965 (Schein 1996).

### Setting the process of capability enhancement in motion

**Arranging diverse modes of access to external knowledge.** The basic industrial development process consists in raising firms from being resource-poor to resource-rich; from firms that are marginal and uncompetitive to firms that are international in scope and competitive insofar as they are able to capture the latecomer advantages that are available. Securing access to the existing knowledge base determines the success of catch-up, because the latecomer firms do not command sufficient capability to generate knowledge by themselves. While it is natural for advanced economies to create most of this knowledge stock, non-advanced economies try to tap into this stock, constrained by the limited channels of knowledge diffusion and their abilities to absorb and adapt new knowledge. In this way, the knowledge from advanced countries to catch-up economies in each sector is a critical element for catch-up. Industry case studies, such as Mu and Lee (2005), confirm the importance of gaining access to the external knowledge base and the high probability of failure of isolated attempts at targeted development of imported technology.

Experiences of Asian countries follow a sequential pattern in the evolution of the channels of access to foreign knowledge. In the earliest stage, the primary channel of learning tends to be technical guidance from foreign original equipment manufacturer buyers or learning by working in FDI firms. In the next stage, when the latecomer firms recognise the need for more systemic learning and planned technological development, such firms tend to resort to technological licensing and actively seek knowledge transfer from any FDI partners. In the next stage, the latecomer firms establish a degree of in-house R&D capacity, and as licensing or learning from foreign partners reveals its limits, the latecomer firms rely on public–private R&D consortia, overseas R&D outposts, or acquisition of and partnership with foreign/specialist firms.

### Promoting export-based engagement with the global economy

Engagement with the global economy is emphasised in the WC. The BeST consensus shares this position—but for different reasons. In the BeST Consensus, there is an element of discipline and performance measurement in the outward orientation. This emphasis is related to a theoretical question: why can outward orientation be an effective development strategy? Aside from the obvious benefits—such as obtaining essential inputs, technologies, capital, and markets to achieve economies of scale—what additional benefits does foreign trade offer? Participation in the world market means that the economy will be subject to external constraints that frame the choices available to a national government (Lee 1992). Export orientation imposes market discipline, which the domestic market is not able to offer to protected producers, and thereby poses a set of constraints on domestic economic policies that prevent the adoption of measures that are severely antithetical to...
growth. In other words, some lack of both economic and political competition within a nation is complemented by competition in world markets. Success in international markets, initially through export success, was seen as a key criterion for evaluating sound management where preferential finance was being made available.

All northeast Asian countries recognised the significance of international competition and the world market in their industrialisation efforts. But engagement with the international economy does not stop there, as they opened themselves to FDI—but often setting conditions on investments by multinational enterprises.

**Targeting industries/technologies for import-substituting development.** The development process consists in growing industries, where firms may flourish and develop enhanced capabilities. But industries cannot be chosen randomly or left to the whim of multinational corporations. To enhance the capabilities of private firms requires assuring them of the initial rents (profits) and learning opportunities until they grow sufficiently to compete successfully in world markets. One effective way to assure such opportunities is to target industries or technologies. Obvious target industries would be those that exhibit externalities or market failure in terms of the gap between private and social return. While mainstream economics would accept only these kinds of industries, we can go beyond this, as there are other targeting opportunities justifiable in the catching-up context.

Warning against targeting comes from uncertainty about the right choices of industries or technologies. For example, no one can tell which industries or technologies will come to prominence in a particular country. But this concern makes more sense in the context of developed countries, whose firms are on the frontier of technologies facing greater uncertainties. In the context of the latecomer, there is ready justification for targeting industries: these are the industries or technologies that the latecomer economies are importing or buying at monopoly prices because the products are monopolised by foreign companies. In this situation, import-substituting targeting involves taking the rents away from foreign companies and shifting them to local companies. In this import-substituting targeted development, local efforts face less uncertainty or risk because targeted technologies are often mature technologies that are not impossible to emulate by concentrated efforts by local indigenous R&D consortia. Successful examples abound in East Asia, including development by local R&D consortia of TDX (digital telephone switches) in Korea and China when digital switches were in serious short supply but monopolised by foreign products (Mu and Lee 2005).

**Sequential upgrading of the leading sectors.** The experiences of northeast Asia indicate that their industrial structure has been continuously changed and upgraded. The initial emphasis was on the reform and industrialisation of agriculture, followed by the building of local manufacturing industries to absorb labour displaced from agriculture, and eventually moving to more capital or knowledge-intensive industries. A close examination of successful catching-up economies finds upgrading in the same industry and successive entry (another kind of upgrading) into new, promising industries. Unless these two kinds of upgrading happen, the chances of successful catch-up are low. This is because new, cheaper labour sites are always emerging to compete for position in the global value chain, forcing firms to move to higher value-adding activities in the same industries. Because the older industries mature and degrade into lower value-adding industries, they are forced to enter new, emerging, and higher value-adding industries.

This need for two kinds of upgrading comes partly from the international industrial life cycle, whereby new industries tend to be created by the developed world and the late-comer countries and firms tend to inherit these industries after they become mature and their products become standardised. Given this life cycle, an important feature of successful catch-up is to be able to enter at an earlier and earlier (higher value-adding) stage of the
cycle over time, which is possible only with enhanced absorption capabilities. Otherwise, firms are doomed to be stuck in the lower-wage activities or industries, with few chances for long-term success.

Examples are numerous in East Asia. Semiconductor firms in Korea and Taiwan began from IC packaging or testing (low value-adding activities), moved to IC fabrication, and eventually to IC design (highest value-adding activity). Since the 1960s, the Tatung company in Taiwan has made successive entry into new industries, starting from black-and-white TVs in 1964, colour TVs in 1969, VCRs, PCs in the mid-1980s, hard disk drives in the mid-1980s, TV Chips/ASICs in the late 1980s, workstation clones in 1989, and so on (Khan 2002). The Samsung group in Korea is well known to have made successive entries into new industries over the 60 years of its history. In this process, the state had an important role in providing a field for a joint R&D consortium and technology transfer, as well as tax and credit concessions for newer industries.

Such a dynamic view of industrial changes is in clear contrast to the mainstream emphasis on static comparative advantage, an uncritical application of which can preserve the state of the world with the developed countries specialised in high value-adding or high margin products and the developing countries locked into low value-adding or low margin products. Furthermore, it does not teach how to move from the latter to the former, and thereby makes the prospects of upgrading development uncertain. While dynamic change in comparative advantage could happen without state intervention, the essence of the BeST Consensus is that some coordination by state agencies could expedite the process of dynamic change and provide a higher likelihood of success.

Creating an economic environment in which capability building will proceed

Building broad-based education. Besides policies targeting the capabilities of private companies, there are some policies that can serve to enhance the basic generic capabilities of the population, such as education to upgrade human capital. All the northeast Asian countries understood that there would not be growth without literacy; and so every effort was made to introduce universal primary education, then universal secondary education (a stage reached now by China), and finally to ramp up college enrolment rates. While education is mentioned in the WC, it is only concerned with the early stages and ignores tertiary education as a means of training the skilled personnel needed in the new industries. The difference between the resources devoted to tertiary education in Latin America and East Asia is striking (Lee and Kim 2009). We see the same process being followed by China.

Creating a financial system that is catch-up friendly. The ‘water’ that ‘irrigates’ the developing economy is finance. If the flows are too great (as in too much capital flowing in from abroad), there can be macroeconomic disturbances leading to credit shocks and disruption. If the flows are too meagre (as in too tight a monetary policy and high interest rates), firms are starved of the funds needed to invest and grow their business. A central bank or its equivalent (such as the Monetary Authority in Singapore) is necessary to keep these matters under review and make adjustments as needed. In all the successful countries of northeast Asia, interest rates were kept low for targeted industries and allowed to float higher in non-targeted sectors.

This situation can be called ‘financial restraint’. As argued by Hellman et al. (1997), manipulation of the interest rate is beneficial to economic development, so long as real interest rates are not persistently negative. Again, the WC is silent on the need for developmental financial instruments, assuming as it does that liberalisation of the financial sector will solve all problems. While the financial repression literature emphasises the role of positive interest rates in mobilising savings, raising the level of income has more direct impacts on savings in low-income countries than the interest rate. This justifies a low interest rate policy to induce a higher investment rate, which in turn leads to higher income and eventually higher savings in the long run.
Moreover, as attested by the numerous financial crashes recorded in the past 15 years, external liberalisation of the financial sector can contribute to financial crises rather than financial deepening. Taiwan, which is not allowed to be a member of the IMF, conducts its financial affairs with great prudence, exercising controls over inward and outward flows of capital. Taiwan was almost untouched by the 1997 Asian financial crisis as a result. By contrast, the early to mid-1990s’ (external) financial liberalisation in Korea and Indonesia was followed by financial crises. China is taking no chances. That is why due regard to the developmental role of financial instruments is an important element of the BeST Consensus—yet it is missing in the WC.

Establishing macroeconomic stability. Since capacity building takes time and requires commitment to decisive investment with a long gestation period, it is important to have stable political and economic conditions. Under unstable conditions, any business person would be hesitant to make long-term commitments. Among the East Asian economies, Taiwan provides the best example with respect to maintaining stable macroeconomic conditions. While other East Asian economies had more turbulent macroeconomic periods, including inflation or external imbalances, until 1997, they avoided the kinds of extreme crises that have haunted many Latin American economies. It is widely agreed that the northeast Asian countries were exemplary in maintaining fiscal balance, consistent interest rates, a cautious exchange rate policy, and careful scrutiny of all overseas transactions by the Ministry of Finance. These cautious approaches to macroeconomic management paid rich rewards.

Gradual phasing out of non-market interventions. The effort to increase competitiveness provides evidence of the respect northeast Asian economies had for the disciplining function of markets and their willingness to accept market outcomes. State intervention in East Asia did not paralyse the disciplining function of the market, but effectively supplemented it with an alternative disciplinary mechanism whenever the intervention weakened market discipline. Furthermore, the goal of protection and industry nurturing was never to maintain a situation protected from market disciplines, but only to allow it for the time needed to bring the industry and the firms within it to the point where they could withstand international competition.

Thus, Japan’s approach to developing its computer industry was to protect it with various devices up until the early 1980s, and then announce that the protections would be abandoned and that the companies would have to stand on their own feet, and feel the bracing effects of international competition. Some companies did very well, such as Fujitsu and NEC, while others crumbled. But MITI refused to intervene and support the failures. We see a similar approach to support and nurture of enterprises in a new industry in other northeast Asian countries, followed by ruthless exposure of the firms and industries to international competition, and a refusal to intervene to help those that flounder.

There is no end to the process of industrialisation. Instead, a country draws closer and closer to an ever-moving frontier. As the frontier is approached and innovation becomes more important than imitation, so it becomes necessary to adapt and even dismantle the institutional arrangements that favoured earlier stages of the process. Japan was caught in this process during its ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s, when it grappled with the issues of dismantling some of the controls and regulations that had worked in earlier stages of its development. Korea dismantled older institutions and introduced new institutions only after the 1997 financial crisis. Taiwan cautiously deregulated its financial sector and external account. While both countries evolved so that parliamentary oversight of the targeting of industries and technologies became more and more insistent and demanding. China too is now experiencing these pressures, particularly at a local and regional level, where democratic institutions are taking root. This is the real meaning of the terms ‘privatisation’, ‘deregulation’, and ‘liberalisation’, which are employed in the WC.
as if they are timeless aspirations. By contrast, according to the Consensus that reigns in Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo, strong government and leadership is required to carry a country through the difficult early stages of industrialisation, but as a certain level of industrial maturity is reached, so the controls can be progressively dismantled and the demands for democracy—that will always express themselves as a country’s standard of living rises—be accommodated. In the end, the pilot agency can be dismantled in favour of a national legislature. At that point, the country has industrialised and can count itself as a ‘modern’ nation.

**Why does the BeST Consensus work?**

**Why is it plausible?**

Before moving to the question of the generalisability of the BeST Consensus as a set of development principles, it is well to inquire into the plausibility of the set of ideas involved. Why should it be expected to work; and why has it worked?

Strangely enough, given the stakes that bodies like the World Bank have in the matter, the investigation of the set of policy mixes that powered the industrialisation of northeast Asia has been subjected to remarkably little independent investigation. It has, of course, been subjected to an enormous amount of rebuttal-oriented investigation, but that is self-defeating. The minimum that critics ought to concede is that the policies applied by Korea, Taiwan, and other countries *did in fact work*. As contrasted with the precepts of the WC, which remain abstract, speculative, and theoretical, the precepts applied in northeast Asia—which we are summarising as a BeST Consensus as to what works—did in fact work.

Several lines of argument can be made in attempting to answer the above questions. The first line of argument concerns the package of precepts themselves, such that all ten elements of the BeST Consensus form a package of complementary and mutually reinforcing prescriptions, with the central focus to foster the capabilities of the latecomer firms. The targeting of industries for development, the targeting of technologies within these industries, and the sequential upgrading are of a piece with the emphasis on building the capabilities of firms. The promotion of engagement with the global economy is not only a means of introducing new sources of competence to local economic agents (through inward FDI) and of expanding the markets and sphere of activities of domestic enterprises (through outward FDI), it is also a means of providing an objective performance (disciplinary) measure of company performance where credit is being targeted (Lall and Urata 2002).

Second, we make the point that the prescriptions of the BeST Consensus work because they are formulated in a way that enables countries implementing them to identify and capture the latecomer effects that are available *at the time*. To refer to institutions as the ‘weapon of the latecomer’ is to capture in a phrase the point that latecomers have the possibility of compensating for their late arrival with institutional innovations that enable them to accelerate their catch-up to industrial leaders, for example, through capturing advanced technologies and diffusing these technologies as quickly as possible to the private sector through institutional innovations, such as targeted R&D consortia. ‘Weapons’ connotes both defensive institutions (for example, to protect a country from excessive flows of ‘hot capital’) and offensive institutions (for example, export consortia to market products collectively in foreign countries). The power of the Gerschenkronian approach lies in the fact that it invites concentration on the issues that matter most—namely, the building of new institutions and the pursuit of fresh strategies, depending on the situation at the time that the country is attempting (or re-attempting) its development push.

A third line of argument concerns the goals of the set of precepts and whether they promote cost reduction or risk reduction. It is commonly assumed in the debates over ‘infant industry protection’ that subsidies are being paid to an infant industry in order to give it time to develop the efficiencies needed to compete—and these are justified in formal terms as creating the conditions where spill-
overs and learning effects may become manifest (Succar 1987). But these cost-reduction kinds of government programs are now severely curtailed by WTO rules, as we discuss below. That leaves intact many of the ‘risk-reduction’ programs perfected in East Asia, which do not depend on any kind of cash transfer but on market opening, or market promotion, or the seeding of new industries as practised by Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. In the semi-conductor sector, for example, Taiwan was able to ‘seed’ the new industry in the 1980s by setting up state-owned corporations that led the way into the market, thus making it easier for private firms to follow them. China is known to be studying such ‘risk-reducing’ approaches to industry development closely.

A fourth line of argument concerns the pragmatism of the implementers of the policy prescriptions that we label the BeST Consensus: these precepts were never set in stone. On the contrary, they were framed in pragmatic terms to deal with issues, and evolved as needed: such as the desire for foreign currency leading to a focus on export industries and this focus in turn providing an objective measure of enterprise performance in the allocation of preferential credit. Neither Park Chung-Hee (Korea) nor Chiang Kai-shek (Taiwan) would have formulated export performance as an objective measure of enterprise success for purposes of targeting credit, yet both were sufficiently flexible that this evolution occurred within their regimes and was found through experience to be highly effective.

Various theorists have tried to capture this adaptability and pragmatic flexibility in various ways. Leibenstein (1968) termed it ‘collective entrepreneurship’, which remains an excellent phrase to capture the state’s experimentation with different approaches and its readiness to change course when needed. Hausmann and Rodrik (2003) capture the same pragmatic spirit in their description of ‘economic development as self-discovery’, where the point is that the developmental state does not have to have an a priori sense of which industries will work best, but can experiment and find out which ones do best, for example, in terms of exports.

For our part, we see the plausibility of the package of principles that we label the BeST Consensus in the way that they continually reinforce a focus, on the part of both firms and institutions, on the central strategic goals of the process, which can be encompassed in a word: catch-up. For this is the ultimate advantage of the latecomer—it has strategic goals that are clearly enunciated and delineated. When a country reaches a developed stage and is on the technological frontier, innovation becomes critical in order to canvass as wide a variety of technical options as possible. Evolutionary processes feed off variety, and selection mechanisms work most cleanly and efficiently when they are fed by adequate variety. But the latecomer cannot afford and does not have to indulge in such luxury. The lines of development have already been laid down, in one industry after another. In semiconductors, Korean firms such as Samsung knew that VLSI CMOS memory chips were going to be the most significant, and so this is what the firm invested in, with full backing from the other technology leverage institutions in Korea. Taiwanese firms knew that fabless operations were going to be the order of the day in Silicon Valley, and that there would be an opening for silicon foundries. So the Taiwanese moved decisively to establish TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company), still the world’s most successful foundry. In the flat panel display industry, which has superseded the semiconductor industry as an agent of growth, again the Korean firms and the Taiwanese firms knew from the prior experience of Japanese firms that the dominant technology would be TFT-LCD, and this is what they focused on, with great effect (Mathews 2005).

Can the BeST Consensus work in other countries and at other times?

Even if it is conceded that the policy settings favoured by the BeST Consensus worked for the countries of northeast Asia from the 1960s to the 1990s, sceptics claim that those same policy settings would not work today, or would not work beyond the countries of north-
east Asia, with their highly distinctive initial conditions, their authoritarian governments, and their highly equal distribution of income. Let us deal with these arguments.

The critical issue concerns the initial conditions. Were there conditions that fundamentally favoured the countries of northeast Asia and which are not found today? Certainly, there are important differences. The most obvious is the international setting, particularly the restrictions that the developed countries have imposed on developing countries through the rules of the WTO. Globalisation means that the world economy is so much dominated by large multinational companies.

We are strongly of the view that countries pursuing a development pathway informed by the BeST Consensus will have the best chance of breaking free of poverty in the 21st century. Our argument moves through four stages.

Defences against rent seeking

A first issue concerns the propensity for rent seeking that the BeST Consensus throws up. Given the emphasis of the northeast Asian approach on state activism and targeting, a serious objection should be raised, namely, that such arrangements will lead to rent seeking. Without active countermeasures, this would indeed be the expected outcome—at least according to standard neo-classical expectations. But it did not turn out that way in the countries of northeast Asia. As Rodrik (1996:19) pithily puts it: ‘Why did trade protection, industrial policy, and subsidised credit work in these countries when it failed most everywhere else?’ Rodrik suggests that part of the explanation might lie in the strong commitment to educational attainment: by the late 1950s, the northeast Asian economies had ‘a much better educated labor force than would have been expected on the basis of their income levels’. And a second, perhaps more salient feature, was that ‘in all of them the distribution of income and wealth around 1960 was exceptionally equal by cross-country standards’.

It is obvious that these two initial conditions are not present in most developing countries. How then can countries get around this problem? We would point to several elements in the BeST Consensus that would act to curb the potential for rent seeking. The first is outward or export orientation, where any preferential resource allocation has to be based on firms’ performance in exports. As explained above, export orientation imposes market discipline, which the domestic market is not able to offer to protected producers and thereby poses a set of constraints on domestic economic policies (Lee 1992). The second element is that the BeST Consensus is strongly biased towards generating new sources of growth and new rents, or taking rents away from foreign firms, lightening any potential burden. In other words, the rules of game are not so much about redistribution of rents as creation and generation of rents. For example, the preferential and targeted public and private R&D consortia (in Korea and China) to develop indigenously digital telephone switches was not about taking away the rents accruing to foreign goods.

WTO constraints—and how to get around them

A second issue concerns the new environment created by the WTO and by global trading conditions generally. Launched in 1995, but stretching back through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO is the organisation that now embodies and enforces the rules for intellectual property protection (TRIPS), for trade-related investment measures, and the general agreement on trade in services. These codes impose stringent restrictions on developing countries’ rights to deploy many of the institutions and policy settings that were available to the countries of northeast Asia, such as infant industry protective tariffs, barriers to inward FDI, and exchange controls (Kohli 2004). In the case of latecomers such as India, one of its most successful strategies, involving the allowance of patenting over generic drug processes but not over products and which was instrumental in India building a strong generic pharmaceuticals industry, was outlawed by TRIPS and had to be abandoned.
Smart countries find ways to work around or through these restrictions, particularly in areas that can be called ‘innovation’ rather than trade or development. As is well known, the WTO rules allow substantial room for state subsidies for R&D expenditure. The USA does lots of state-led R&D in the name of defence-related R&D—and smart developing countries will follow its example. Developing countries can pay much more attention to their ‘national systems of innovation’ not only because R&D conducted through government research institutes is important in developing domestic technological capabilities, but also because this provides a path through the tangle of WTO rules and restrictions.

A catch-up-friendly world economic system?

While we argue that catching-up development is still possible, even under the WTO regime, we recognise that the world economic system is increasingly making catch-up more difficult. In this regard, one serious issue is IPR (intellectual property right) protection and some moves toward IPR regime standardisation. Given our emphasis on capacity building and access to knowledge, we are concerned about the possible anti-catch-up impacts of the stringent and standardised enforcement of IPRs. However, as is now well-known and analysed in World Bank-sponsored research, such as Fink and Maskus (2005), the welfare-enhancing effects of stronger IPR protection cannot be warranted even by neo-classical economics, as it notes the trade-offs between innovation-enhancing and monopoly-enhancing effects. Furthermore, in the context of most developing countries, even the innovation-encouraging effects are less warranted. The simple logic of more IPR protection leading to more R&D assumes implicitly that R&D capabilities already exist, which is not the case in developing countries. What matters more for them is to build R&D capabilities first, such as through engaging in design and manufacture contractual arrangements, and then protecting those designs through enhanced IPR protection—as is happening in China. Otherwise, IPR protection simply serves the interests of dominant economic powers.

Stiglitz (2006) noted that the danger of monopolisation is greater in small developing countries because markets are smaller and more frequently dominated by one firm or a limited number of firms. Thus, he emphasised that developing countries should be given more scope in deciding what kind of industrial policies are appropriate in giving them opportunity to create new industries. So too should these powers be granted in the area of intellectual property (Stiglitz 2006:119). We view favourably Stiglitz’s principle of asymmetric or cascading opening to foreign trade (where a richer country opens its markets to countries less rich than itself), and see this principle as being consistent with our focus on the need for international engagement; after all, the scheme of international engagement that worked in northeast Asia was asymmetric opening of export promotion, combined with import control. Such an opportunity needs to be offered to the next generation of developing countries.

Authoritarian regime needed to drive development?

An important question for developing countries today in seeking to apply the lessons of the BeST Consensus is a political one. Put most starkly: does a country have to be governed by an authoritarian regime in order to foster the discipline and coordination needed to implement the prescriptions of the BeST Consensus? We first concede that authoritarian regimes may be in a better position in terms of implementation capabilities. Certainly, the Park regime in Korea and the Chiang KMT regime in Taiwan are instances of this. Japan is the obvious counter-case, and even Singapore, which has clear authoritarian overtones but has remained a democracy throughout its development trajectory. Of course, democracy has emerged in the fullness of time in Korea and Taiwan, as the countries grew wealthier, and it is certainly emerging at a local level in China.
We see obvious advantages in democracy, amongst which is the convenient feature that citizens are not subject to arbitrary arrest and torture. Truly strong states get it wrong more often than they get it right. Thus, the military dictatorships of Latin America left little in the way of legacy—save perhaps for the biofuels program in Brazil—whereas the military dictatorships in Korea and Taiwan (while not on anything like the same scale of brutality) left a powerful legacy of development. The difference clearly lies in strategic orientation and in institutional capacity in formulating and implementing a program of national industrial development. Our point is that this is an option available to the political leadership of any developing country today; however, the thesis of the ‘authoritarian advantage’ is not easily maintained (Rius and de Walle 2005). While the case of China is consistent with this thesis, the case of India is not. The developing countries of the 21st century will need strong states, but authoritarian regimes will not necessarily be of assistance.

Concluding remarks

As the WC has lost credibility, it has been augmented by a long list of so-called ‘second-generation’ reforms that are heavily institutional in nature (Rodrik 2006). Most recently, the Commission on Growth and Development (2008), established under the auspices of the World Bank, acknowledged the importance of government activism and industrial policy, while expressing caution over hasty liberalisation and privatisation. A so-called ‘augmented WC’ has emerged, including additional elements, such as corporate governance, anti-corruption, flexible labour markets, compliance with WTO agreements, financial codes and standards, prudent capital-account opening, non-intermediate exchange rate regimes, independent central banks/inflation targeting, and social safety nets. In our view, this remains a shopping list rather than a recipe for successful development. We agree with the criticism of Rodrik (2006) that its emphasis on institutions is a dead end, because the most ambitious institutional reform efforts can always be faulted ex post for having left something out. The cross-national empirical literature has failed to establish a strong causal link between any particular design feature of institutions and sustained economic growth—as discussed in the World Bank’s (2005) report.

From our perspective, it is striking to see that not only the augmented list and the World Bank’s 2008 Growth Commission report but also the recent Barcelona Consensus still leave the building of technological capabilities by private firms as a marginal issue, whereas, in our view, the evidence from East Asia indicates that this is the real binding constraint on sustained growth.

The key difference between the WC and what we are calling the BeST Consensus is that the WC was and is speculative; the WC is based on what neo-classical economists would like to see, whereas the BeST Consensus is based on what successful developing countries have actually done. The significance of China is that it demonstrates clearly that the policies that worked in other countries can be expected to work again, if adapted to new global conditions and if modified in the light of new possibilities and opportunities. China is successfully industrialising as a member of the WTO and abiding by WTO rules. China is pragmatic in its approach in that it tries various policies to see which one works best.

Our BeST Consensus represents a distillation of what pragmatic governments in northeast Asian countries have done in order to lift their countries out of poverty. We formulate and generalise these pragmatic prescriptions, not just in terms of what individual countries actually did but with an eye to their wider application by developing countries looking for a different set of prescriptions to lift themselves out of poverty in the early years of the 21st century. Since the World Bank and other multilateral institutions seem to have run out of ideas, why not try the ideas that we know work, suitably adapted to the conditions of the countries that are desperately trying to escape from poverty?
References


