Materiali Didattici

Notes for Lecture 1: Cournot Oligopoly

Notes for Lecture 2, 3 and 4: Bertrand Oligopoly and CollusionGraph Bertrand best resposes

Notes for Lecture 5: Auctions with private values

Notes for Lecture 6: Auctions with private values under incomplete info

Notes for Lecture 7: The Winner’s CurseCommon Value Auctions model 1Common Value Auctions model 2

Notes for Lecture 8: Entry deterrence

Main reference: Section 8.2 in J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988.

Charlie Brown and the value commitment:

Notes for Lecture 9: Predation (main reference: Ch. 21 in the C&W textbook)

Problem set 1: Part II – PS1

Problem set 2: Part II – PS2

Problem set 3: Part II – PS3

Problem set 4: Part II – PS4

Problem set 5: Part II – PS5

Mock exam questions: Mock exam – Part II

Oligopolistic markets and market dominance:

Additional material on collusion:

Invited lecture on Friday, November 20: “Competition in Public Procurement Markets” delivered by  Prof. Christopher R. Yukins (webpage),  Lynn David Research Professor in Government Procurement Law and Co- Director, Government Procurement Law Program, The George Washington University Law School – Lecture slides